Fighting the Wrong War in the Wrong Way with the Wrong Weapons for the Wrong Reasons

Proxying Ukraine

Published: 2024-09-04

Updated 2024-09-05: Added an Annex in which a recent Russian change of distributing Iskander missiles to the brigade level is presented.

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Col. Jacques Baud has provided the most insightful military strategic analysis of the NATO war versus Russia in Ukraine. This began for English language video media in 2023 when he introduced the term "War of Attrition" which now is the perspective used to understand the core strategy employed by Russia in NATO's war.

In his recent discussion with Nima Alkhorshid, Baud has some new data which provides a foundation for another aspect of his instructive analysis.

He provided a slide in which are summarised 5 generations of the concept of fighting a war. He uses numbers: 1st Generation, ... 5th Generation. I suggest not implying any improvement in the generations. They are just different.

The first two are for pre-WW-II era fighting. 3rd Gen is the combined arms warfare seen in WW-II epitomized by the German Blitzkrieg. 4th Gen is counter-insurgency war, the type of war the US and NATO have been fighting for 3 decades. 5th Gen is "full spectrum" war, incorporating financial sanctions, Internet/Network attacks ("cyber") and propaganda on top of a kinetic component.

Baud's hypothesis is that the US, with NATO partners, tried a 5th Gen war in which Ukraine provided the kinetics using NATO's advanced weaponry. It failed when Russia avoided and then reflected the economic attack.

There was a key turning point in the war. Russia's initial dash to place forces near Kiev could have produced its desired outcome — a settlement of the war after only a few weeks. This was prevented by the West, represented by then UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson who pledged "unending support" to Ukrainian President Zelensky to not settle and fight on. With this defeat of Russia's effort to finish the war at its outset, Russia's military leadership were allowed to employ their strategy for war. The full national economy attritional "3rd Gen" approach took over. It has proven itself on the fields of former Ukraine. The ratio of the dead is still approximately 1:5 for Russia:NATO/Ukraine soldiers.

Why, after the failure of Ukrainian/NATO’s offensive of late Spring to mid Autumn, 2023, has Ukraine not improved one year on?

The current understanding, even in media which have supported NATO's war in Ukraine, is that the Ukrainian invasion of Russia was not a folly, but an utter disaster. It was provoked by having nothing left with which to operate, a last "hail Mary pass", in US vernacular. This analogy is poor. A hail Mary pass does not result in the death of half of the football team.

The war has seen a series of propaganda efforts in which NATO has supplied the latest batch of "wunderweapons". These have all failed to have any lasting impact in the war. The first person to identify the root cause of this consistent problem was Brian Berletic. Baud generalizes on this. Berletic's observation was that each of these new systems required training. Insufficent time was allocated to provide it. A limited group would be provided with basic training.

Berletic's corollary was that each of these systems required independent maintenance crews with their related but separate training. These never existed in sufficient volume. Damaged systems needed to be moved back into NATO nations where repairs would be made, to then have the system transported all of the 2 000 Km back to the fronts. This has been a constant logistical nightmare.

As the “wunderweapon” process continued, the hodge-podge of mixed systems being inefficiently employed by the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and their NATO operators and contractors grew. How are mechanized brigades meant to interoperate effectively with mixed tanks of different capabilities and non-interoperable shells? The same is true for armored fighting vehicles, or any other system. How was the AFU meant to synergize their combined arms when the battalions below the brigade level were composed of mixtures of training and equipped with a kaleidoscope of systems with limited local repair capability?

Within this hodge-podge almost all of the NATO provided systems' design was over 30 years old. Leopard 1 tanks were "upgraded" to Leopard 2A4, which were still 30 years old. It is no match for a T90M. NATO was discarding old equipment into the hands of the AFU. Some of this equipment was so bad the AFU sent it back.

Did NATO not see the consequences of this inoperable dog's breakfast of machines coming? Did they care? Were they just happy to "donate" their "useful in training only" garbage to Ukraine? How cavalier were NATO's military leadership? Could they actually understand the consequences of the growing pile of non-interoperable machines being used by disparately trained AFU units?

NATO's recent three decades of experience is fighting counter-insurgency wars. In a counter-insurgency ("4th Gen") war, there is no grand strategy. One's focus is at the engagement or tactical level. One is fighting a series of engagements, usually with better intelligence than the enemy and almost always with better weaponry. One also has more forces which can be delivered to overwhelm the enemy. A national, technologically advanced, armed force is fighting rebels.

Baud uses mathematical terms which are helpful. In this 4th Gen war, there are no significant relations between the engagements. Their result is cumulative. One victory is added to the previous. They are not designed to synergize, to multiply off each other. It is an incremental, or additive rather than multiplicative approach.

The integrated "3rd Gen" tactics of the AFRF are multiplicative. The edges of their advances target logistics. The locations of the heaviest fighting have again been to remove Ukrainian logistics. Their attacks on NATO provided Ukrainian radar systems give Russia freedom of movement in the skies. Russia's innovation of the FAB glide bombs were designed to counter the defensive positions built by Ukraine. This minimized Russian causalties and thus, the amount of force required to pressure the position. This allowed Russia to maintain the width of fronts.

At almost every turn, Russia's military actions have minimized their casualties and maximized Ukraine's and/or damaged their logistics or defensive capability. Russia's "3rd Gen" warfare has multiplicative, attritional synergy. The AFU's odd success adds to little, except in Western media.

An additional dimension in which this difference is revealed is morale. The AFRF is emotionally strong. Their morale extends across the brigades and commands, from the newly, properly trained volunteers to the experienced officers and all of their families. This has been squandered in Ukraine. The AFU is fractured by a small remaining experienced core surrounded by forced conscripts with minimal training. The former don't trust the latter, and with good reason. Poorly trained recruits get experienced soldiers killed.

The better trained units of the AFU were trained by NATO officers who have only fought a 4th Gen "counter-insurgency" type of war. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) are not a bunch of rebels. The AFRF are fighting a "3rd Gen" combined-arms war, but with advanced weaponry and plenty of it. Their intelligence services are equipped with satellite imagery and foreign informants, not just monitorable mobile phone calls from nearby villages.

Baud's point is that NATO has trained the AFU to fight a 4th Gen war against Russia which is fighting a 3rd Gen one, with the full force of Russia and its allies behind it. This partially explains the total lack of any improvement by Ukraine in its campaign since forcing Russia to withdraw from Kharkiv in the summer of 2022. Russia did also withdraw from Kherson, but that was an operational choice not forced on it by Ukraine.

That was two years ago. Since then, Ukraine has nothing to say for itself but 600 000 casualties suffered. The positions which scattered AFU units hold in Kursk do not count. They will die there.

Baud offered another very important observation. Ukraine's population are beginning to understand that they have been used by their US and NATO "partners". Baud cites a recent article in a Kiev newspaper which publicized this understanding.

A Western audience may be shocked by the corruption which is endemic to Ukrainian political institutions whereas an Ukrainian may accept this as how things are done. Betrayal is a totally different emotion. That this is beginning to be expressed in a Kiev newspaper is likely a tip of the iceberg of Ukrainian society. As an acceptance of this understanding ripples through Ukrainian society and its armed forces, the response is likely to be dramatic.

A political upheaval in Kiev has been expected for some time, given the utter catastrophe of the NATO war. This acknowledgment of betrayal may be the tipping point for a radical change in political control in the capital.

Political Resignations in Kiev

Ukrainin Foreign Minister Kuleba has resigned, in addition to four other cabinet ministers.

Deputy Prime Ministers Vereshchuk and Stefanishyna left their posts.

Associated Press notes that this is the largest cabinet change in Ukraine since the start of the Special Military Operation. Something is cooking in Kiev.

Annex

A change in Russia's use of its precision missiles has recently been noted and emphasized by Dima (Military Summary). Oliver Boyd-Barret also commented and summarized the change:

All Russian artillery brigades are now being equipped with Iskander missiles and have the authority to use them.

One imagines that Russia's reconnaissance drones are closely attached to artillery brigades. Communications between the ISR operators and the artillery brigades are certainly rapid and practiced. The delay caused by higher approval to use the expensive Iskander is removed.

The result is two-fold. Firstly, the capability is more geographically distributed. This likely reduces flight time, as the launch site is closer to the target. Secondly, the decision making process to fire at a discovered target is reduced. In combination these reduce the AFU’s window of opportunity to “fire and hide”.

Recent footage has demonstrated some methodology employed by the artillery brigade leadership. When an important target (an anti-air radar, or a HIMARS system) is identified and is moving, it is tracked until it becomes stationary. It is only then that the attack is launched. In another case, a HIMARS was discovered and attacked. Reconnaissance was maintained. It identified a rescue crew coming to the aid of personnel who survived the attack. They were tracked until they then became stationary, at which point a follow up attack was launched.

The sophisticated weaponry or intelligence gathering systems in use by the Armed Forces of Ukraine are operated, or overseen, by NATO personnel. Attacks on them cause NATO casualties.

We have seen throughout the war Russia targeting NATO units, especially training centers. A recent attack on a hotel was thought to be targeted because it housed NATO personnel. The recent attack on a communications training facility killed Swedish personnel believed to be associated with Sweden's supply of two AWACS observation and communications aircraft. [Update: Gilbert Doctorow informed, on Judging Freedom 2024-09-06, that at Poltava Sweden was defeated by Russia under the command of Tsar Peter the Great in 1709 CE. Sweden’s defeat was pivotal, ending its imperial ambitions in the region and furthering Russia’s.]

In all of the above we can see the multiplicative impacts of Russian engagements. Destroying HIMARS systems not only removes their threat, but causes NATO casualties. The destruction of air defense systems provides freedom of movement to the Russian airforce and removes NATO troops. The now more rapid and distributed Iskander strikes are applying both military and political pressure. Opportunities are able to taken when previously the approval process may have allowed them to slip.

The artillery brigade leadership are no doubt happy to have their new freedom and capability. Their methodology demonstrates that they are being effective in target selection and engagement. They wish to maintain their capability. They are not squandering it.

This small change of distributed and delegated Iskander strike capability at the artillery brigade level is having direct consequences. The AFU is short on everything. Losing high value systems and personnel more frequently is placing even more pressure on its leadership and capability.

Additional Source

Peace So Far, Away, Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Natylie's Place: Understanding Russia, 2024-09-05

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Sources

Russian Offensive Picking Up Steam, Larry Johnson, SONAR21, 2024-09-04

Ukraine's Foreign Minister Resigns Amid Government Shake-Up, Dave DeCamp, Antiwar, 2024-09-04

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Kuleba resigns as Russian strikes kill 7 people in Lviv, Illia Novikov & Emma Burrows, AP, 2024-09-04

Three Ukrainian Ministers Offer to Resign in Broad Reshuffle, Aliaksandr Kudrytski and Kateryna Chursina, Bloomberg, 2024-09-03

[US] NATO v Russia: 2014 - 2024, YesXorNo, 2024-03-09

Col. Jacques Baud： Is Ukraine Facing Major Setbacks ？ - Israel’s Army Crisis： Is it Their Economy？ [Zc67u-7WLTE], Alkhorshid interviews Baud, 2024-09-03

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