Russia on China in the Heartland
A window into Chinese foreign policy directions and concerns in central Asia from a Russian academic.
Published: 2024-06-20
Watching Calmly over the Wall
The Russia in Global Affairs academic journal has published a three and a half thousand word article by Dr. Leksyutina which reviews Chinese foreign policy in central Asia by considering articles from significant Chinese foreign policy analysts. Leksyutina disregards any perceived discomfort from recent changes in the mechanisms China is using to implement its foreign policy in the "stans" (the 5 central Asian nations: Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).
Leksyutina's main period of review is from 2020 to the present, though she begins by noting that China only established diplomatic relations with the region in 1992 (which obviously follows the dissolution of the USSR, a fact so obvious to the primary audience its mention would be a waste of space). She notes that it was during the 2008 economic crisis that China replaced Russia as the primary trading partner for these nations, which shall be later referred to as the '5' (note: Kazakhstan is not included).
To emphasize the amount of Chinese foreign investment and economic engagement in the crucial region, Leksyutina provides:
According to Chinese statistics, by the end of March 2023, China’s accumulated direct investment in the five Central Asian countries exceeded $15 billion, while the accumulated volume of engineering and construction contracts amounted to $63.9 billion (Sun, 2023, p. 20). China signed currency swap agreements with all Central Asian countries. Chinese UnionPay cards are used in all Central Asian countries but Turkmenistan.
She summarizes China's motives with:
Beijing is promoting economic development in Central Asia not only to realize its own economic interests, but also to build a security belt of prosperity, stability, and peace along its western border. Beijing fears the effect upon its western regions of nearby socio-political instability, cross-border and inter-ethnic conflicts, and the spread of extremism from Afghanistan and the Middle East. The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is especially vulnerable to the “three forces of evil” (terrorism, extremism, and separatism).
Those 'own interests' are whatever China's national targets may be, which one assumes are being assisted by the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has been the backbone of China's Eurasian foreign policy for over a decade. Leksyutina assists the reader by providing a Chinese classification of zones of foreign policy, and notes that central Asia (the '5') fall within all of them:
The Central Asian countries feature prominently at all four levels of contemporary Chinese diplomacy: (1) “periphery/neighborhood diplomacy” (周边外交) due to their geographical proximity; (2)“developing countries’ diplomacy” (发展中国家外交) due to their developing status; (3) “multilateral diplomacy” (多边外交) due to their membership alongside China in multilateral mechanisms; and (4) “great power diplomacy” (大国外交) because of great power rivalry in Central Asia.
Leksyutina stresses that "Beijing has painstakingly avoided challenging Russia’s special status in the region and maintained harmonious relations with Moscow." She moves on to note that the SCO, a very important Chinese and Russian multilaterial Eurasian organisation which includes security cooperation, had two limitations which hindered some of China's non-security related foreign policy goals. Those shortcomings were that Turkmenistan was not a member and that some policy areas were outside of the SCO agenda.
Meanwhile, Japan (2004), South Korea (2007), the United States (2015), India (2019), and Russia (2019) had all established fora with the '5'. In 2020, China established its own "1+5" dialogue mechanism.
Since 2023, the “1+5” mechanism has been operating at the level of heads of state (summits are to be held every two years). The first China-Central Asia summit was held in May 2023.
Leksyutina provides additional background to assist her audience understanding that China's establishment of the "1+5" mechanism was timely, sensible and does not attempt to supplant Russia's historically strong influence in the region. Indeed, if one reads carefully, she may even be suggesting that China is doing some of the heavy lifting while Russia cannot due to its required focus on Ukraine, and that this effort by China is being done with respect for Russia's interests. China's engagement excludes security, or put another way, China has deliberately left security to Russia.
As a western analyst, this author is completely unsurprized. The region's security establishments were trained by Russian security experts in Russia doctrine using Russian equipment. Recall that China has invited one, and only one, foreign military onto its soil. That military was the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. While there have been tensions in Asia between China and Russia, under their recent decade and half of cooperation and coordination, these disputes have not only been reconciled, but they have established cultural exchanges in these regions to cement that cooperation. China will not have forgotten that it was Russia, which kept its promise to the US and UK to open its eastern front in WWII and attack Japan on the exact day at the end of its 'within 3 years' commitment. China knows that Russia defeated Japan in Manchuria to remove that humiliation. China also knows, even if the US will not acknowledge it, that that defeat of Japan in Manchuria completed the defeat of Japan in WWII, and that the use of atomic weapons by the US was entirely gratuitous and grotesque.
Leksyutina's review conveys China's concerns, particularly of Sinophobia in some regions, and that China understands its lack of soft power in much of the greater region. China is concerned by other regional actors raising their interests in the region, citing Turkey, India, and Japan as examples. China sees more geographically remote threats from the US and the EU. Leksyutina informs the audience that Chinese scholars believe that central Asia is an optimal place for the US and its allies to disrupt and destabilize Chinese and Russia cooperation. Leksyutina cites Chinese scholars noting counter-infrastructure projects and security destabilization by the US and G7 allies.
Other significant Chinese concerns are also noted:
China lacks understanding of, and influence over, Central Asian security policies and related issues. The institutionalization of China’s cooperation with Central Asian countries is still insignificant, especially when it comes to consular protection, customs quarantine, aviation control, travel security, disaster relief, etc.(Deng, 2022, pp. 36, 38).
Chinese experts see the uncertain situation in Afghanistan, the revival of pan-Turkism and, especially, the increasing activity of a range of major players (the U.S., the EU, Turkey, India, and others) in Central Asia as serious challenges to China (Deng, 2022, p. 35-36).
To partially counter its lack of 'soft power' and some sinophobia, China is promoting its BRI projects in central Asia by increasing their engagement with the local population through the creation of technical schools.
China has begun to build Luban workshops—specialized centers for vocational training of local people so that projects implemented under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative can employ skilled local labor. Tajikistan, and then Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, have received Luban workshops. Work on them is underway in Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, too.
Leksyutina concludes by emphasizing China's considered delicacy in its engagement with central Asia. Its foreign policy experts acknowledge an inescapable fact expressed as two sides of the same coin, in:
whether China is facing great power competition or simply building relations with Central Asian countries, it cannot do without stable relations with Russia in the region. The effectiveness of China’s engagement in Central Asia largely depends on coordination between China and Russia.
One may in passing note that increased relations between the Russian Federation and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea benefits both Russia and China. The content of agreements signed during the Russian President’s recent visit will have been known of and approved by China, beforehand. Both the DPRK and the US will have expected this too.
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Sources
Leksyutina, Ya.V., 2024. Chinese Policy in Central Asia in the Estimation of Chinese Experts. Russia in Global Affairs, 22(2), pp. 141–154. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2024-22-2-141-154
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