US Intelligence Leaks: The Criminal Complaint

United States of America v. Jack Douglas Teixeira

[Image: Bullet Holes. Source.]

Published 2023-04-15

Update 2023-04-23: John Helmer has published a report supporting the patsy theory. A short commentary has been added, and the source.

Update 2023-05-01: John Helmer has provided another article with details of Teixeira’s appearence in court. The charges have been adjusted, which is interesting. See Update below the transcript of the original charges.

Update 2023-05-12: Judge Napolitano interviews Larry Johnson and it is revealed that the “arsenal”, the “weapons cache” of the accused Teixeria is a collection of paint-ball guns. The FBI are idiots or lying to the Judge or both. Source added.

---

This article is the third in a series on the “US Intelligence Leaks” or Spring-Offensive-Gate, as I like to call it. The original is here and the second here.

A companion podcast is also available.

Introduction

The Criminal Complaint presented to Magistrate David H. Hennessy in the Federal Court for the district of Massachusetts in Boston by FBI Special Agent Patrick M. Lueckenhoff listed the charges and provided an affidavit to show probable cause. From the affidavit we can learn that which the FBI believes it knows.

These are assertions which Jack Douglas Teixeira's legal representatives will have every opportunity to question or refute. The accused is innocent until found guilty by every court which he may use to assert his innocence (i.e District, Appellate and Supreme) or he admits his guilt.

The Structure of the Complaint

Paragraphs 1 to 3 (INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND) name the accused and and investigating officer and list the sections of the US criminal code which the accused is being charged with violating. Included in these boilerplate paragraphs is the statement that not all information is presented, merely that sufficient to establish probable cause to justify an arrest warrant

Paragraphs 4 to 12 (STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND DEFINITIONS) detail the specific sections of the criminal code and Executive Orders which are relevant to the following section in which the affidavit provides the evidence for probable cause.

Paragraphs 13 to 27 (PROBABLE CAUSE) provide the FBI's assertions which are summarized below. A verbatim transcript of this section of the complaint is provided below as an appendix.

Paragraph 28 (CONCLUSION) is the formal request for the court to issue an arrest warrant based on the affidavit for transgression of the named sections of the criminal code.

The complaint finishes formally with "Sworn to under the pains and penalties of perjury".

The Honorable Magistrate Judge David H. Hennessy signed the submitted complaint declaring that the affiant (the FBI officer) swore before him via telephone at 9:49 am on 2023-04-14.

Terms

The affidavit uses some terms which I believe, from the news media, we can substitute.

• "Social Media Platform 1" is Discord

• "User 1" is an informant who claims to have been a member of the private Discord server maintained by the accused. This is possibly, but not necessarily the individual interviewed by the Washington Post published on April 12. Note that this informant was interviewed on April 10. Thus, if they are the same, it would explain why it is appears that the person interviewed has rehearsed his lines. He has already been interviewed by the FBI.

• "Subject Username" is "OG" which the FBI believes was used by the accused.

Summary of the Probable Cause Paragraphs

Again, these are not necessarily facts or even if so, may not be relevant to the case. The accused has yet to have his day in court. I make this statement not to "protect my arse" but because this is how the legal process works. I refer to the accused as "the accused" for that is all he is in the eyes of the law.

The two core non-governmental sources of information for the FBI are the informant, who as mentioned above claims to have been a member of the Discord server, and Discord itself (the company).

Discord provided the real name of the accused and his address used to register the “private” server. Because the informant could provide the FBI with a physical description of the accused, assuming they had not physically met, they are very likely to have used the video chat feature available on Discord. The informant also informed the FBI that the server administrator "OG" had the first name of "Jack". The informant also identified the accused based on their drivers license photo in a photo lineup.

Having identified the accused the FBI obtained records from the US Air National Guard (USANG). The address used by the accused in registering the Discord server matches that used as his primary residence with the USANG. The FBI obtains from the USANG the accused's entry and current rank and title. The USANG describes his current rank is E-3/Airman First Class and his title is "Cyber Defense Operations Journeyman".

The FBI claims that to hold this rank the accused must have a Top Security clearance, and that this was granted in 2021. This clearance was even extended to SCI (Sensitive Compartmented Information). I assume that to utilize this he would require access to some security facility, such as a SCIF as mentioned by Larry Johnson.

The informant describes a transition from transcriptions of classified information to images of printed classified documents.

The informant claims that the accused uploaded a document to the private Discord server which described the conflict in Ukraine, including troop movements. The FBI claims that "An Original Classification Authority has confirmed" that this document "is classified as TS//SCI". See Paragraph 17.

The date upon which this document (image of a document?) was uploaded/published is not specified.

The informant claims that the activity of informing the Discord community of government sensitive information began in December 2022. I presume this would be the transcribed text versions of sensitive information which would later become imagery of printed classified documents. Again, we do not have a date for the transition from transcription to imagery.

Analysis

I presume that the judge's signature and stamp means that the arrest warrant was approved (which was after the accused was removed from his abode). I concur with the judge (not that this matters one whit). The triangulation of data from the informant, Discord and the USANG correlate the name, address and photograph of the accused. Records from the USANG showing his title and the supposed required access of TS//SCI mean that the accused had the clearance to potentially access many of the documents which have been published. Thus, the accused theoretically has the means. The affidavit does not describe motive. IANAL (I am not a lawyer), and expect that this is not required for an arrest warrant.

Because, as stated in the boilerplate section, we do not know what other information the FBI possess, little can be made of other aspects of the case. The most damning evidence is the Paragraph 17 claim by the informant that a classified document which the FBI claim the relevant authority had classified as TS//SCI was uploaded to the private Discord server. It doesn’t matter before the eyes of the law if only one person without clearance saw this. That’s enough.

If the FBI can obtain a backup or digital copy of the Discord server from anytime after the accused begins uploading images, and they can obtain traffic records from the NSA or another organisation which shows the source address as belonging to the accused, they have a pretty bullet proof case.

Until then, its the word of the informant vs. the word of the defendant.

I sadly expect the usual behaviour of the charge sheet being repeatedly expanded, piling on the charges, to encourage a plea deal. The accused is going to need very good legal counsel.

Commentary

Let us assume that the core narrative, outlined by the Washington Post as supported by the person interviewed, is correct. This narrative is also supported by the FBI affidavit in the criminal charge.

This means that, since the accused began removing classified documents from the SCIF and then the military base (Otis Air National Guard Base in Massachusetts) until this was discovered, two failures of security were persistent. Firstly, the accused removed the sensitive material from the SCIF and secondly from the base. This is a total information security failure for probably many weeks. If the cross posting did not occur, this could have gone on for God knows how long. This is an utter, utter physical information security failure by the US military. Imagine that the accused was actually doing espionage and supplying this information to an adversary, and actually had the tradecraft to keep this hidden. Hmmm? Its that bad.

Next, why the hell does a USANG officer, even a "cyber" officer have access to TS//SCI? The US military really need to segment their networks or minimally introducee the concept of distribution for highly sensitive intelligence products. Did they learn nothing from the Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning case? That was 13 YEARS AGO. A decade of their diplomatic cables were exposed by a private in Iraq. Now parts an SCI intelligence product has been plastered all over the web. When will these fools get their comeuppance?

These people are incompetent and inept. I speak with some expertise on this matter. I was the head systems administrator for a small to medium enterprise. We had better security than this. The US military's digital access/authorization design is also an utter, utter failure. Do they keep access logs? If so, do they audit them? Have they built automated tools to flag strange access? Surely a Journeyman accessing a product designed with a distribution of only the top level of the military is a red flag!

The person interviewed by WaPo described the server administrator as very intelligent. It would seem that he has some reasonable computing skills. He, however, has no idea about Operational Security, or OpSec, as its known in the industry. He should certainly not have used his home address when registering with Discord, or ever used the video chat feature of Discord. It is this complete lack of OpSec which had him identified so rapidly.

The accused is young. He was playing with fire. If his motivations are as described by the person interviewed, that he was outraged by the lies of the government, then I feel for him. He was whistleblowing to a tiny community, and perhaps he was also addicted to the power that he felt from access to this restricted information.

A sadness here is that he could not find a person within the military speak with, to voice his concerns. His commanding officer shares a little blame here on two fronts. It seems that the accused did not, or did not feel able to consult him or her, and the officer did not identify the turmoil which the accused must have been experiencing. I may be completely wrong here, and perhaps I expect too much.

I have fallen for a trap myself. I tell myself to assume incompetence before conspiracy. A conspiracy is not yet ruled out, but I must admit that incompetence by both the US military and the accused are looking far more likely than a conspiracy to explain the events surrounding the "US Intelligence Leaks" saga.

This does not change that:

• The highest echelons of the US military have been lying to Congress and the people

• The war in Donbas cannot be won by Ukraine

Both of which are demonstrated by the contents of the intelligence product.

It remains unknown who cross posted the information out of the “private” Discord server to the wider web. This is where the conspiracy can reside in which the accused is the patsy. The scenario described in the last article can still explain these events.

Update 2023-04-23

In Dances with Bears John Helmer, a long term reporter on Russian affairs has published and extensive article which cites many sources to support the case that Teixeira was essentially entraped by a group wishing to undermine the Spring Offensive due to its risk of not only losing the Ukraine was but also undermining NATO in Europe.

Helmer is a good reporter. I recommend his article be read with a careful eye. It bolsters the “patsy” case. We are thus left with two reasonable explanations of incompetence and pride or entrapment and patsy.

Appendix: Verbatim Copy of the PROBABLE CAUSE section of the CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

Case 1:23-mj-04293-DHH Document 3-1 Filed 04/14/23

PROBABLE CAUSE

13. As described more fully below, there is probable cause to believe that TEIXEIRA improperly and unlawfully retained and transmitted national defense information classified at the TS//SCI level to persons not authorized to receive such information.

14. The FBI has been investigating the unauthorized disclosure of classified national defense information in connection with the posting of dozens of images of documents on various public Internet sites. Many of the documents depicted in these images bear classification markings, including “TOP SECRET” markings, which would serve to indicate the presence of U.S. Government classified information, including national defense information (the “Government Information”). Many of these images were posted on a publicly accessible U.S.social media platform (“Social Media Platform 1” [footnote 1]). Certain of the images appear to depict Government Information that was used to inform senior military and civilian government officials during briefings at the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia.

[footnote 1] Social Media Platform 1 is a VOIP and instant messaging social platform. Users of Social Media Platform 1 have the ability to communicate with voice calls, video calls, text messaging, and can post media and files in private chats or as part of communities called “servers.” A Social Media Platform 1 server is a collection of persistent chat room and voice channels, some of which can only be accessed via invitation from a current chat room member.

15. On or about April 10, 2023, the FBI interviewed a user of Social Media Platform1 (“User 1”). According to User 1, an individual using a particular username (the “Subject Username”) began posting what appeared to be classified information on Social Media Platform1 in or about December 2022 on a specific server (“Server 1”) within Social Media Platform 1. According to User 1, the individual using the Subject Username was the administrator of Server 1. User 1 indicated that the purpose of Server 1 was to discuss geopolitical affairs and currentand historical wars.

16. According to User 1, the individual using the Subject Username initially posted the Government Information as paragraphs of text. However, in or around January 2023, the Subject Username began posting photographs of documents on Server 1 that contained what appeared to be classification markings on official U.S. Government documents.

17. According to User 1, one of the documents that was posted on Server 1 by the individual using the Subject Username was a document that described the status of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, including troop movements, on a particular date (the “Government Document”). The Government Document is based on sensitive U.S. intelligence, gathered through classified sources and methods, and contains national defense information. An Original Classification Authority has confirmed that the Government Document is classified at the TS//SCI level. As described above, the unauthorized disclosure of TOP SECRET information “reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security” of the United States. Exec. Order 13526 § 1.2(a)(1), 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 707–08 (Jan. 5, 2010).

18. User 1 told the FBI that he spoke to the individual using the Subject Username at various times using a video chat application, voice calls, or the chat function on Server 1. According to User 1, during one of those conversations, the individual using the Subject Username explained that he had become concerned that he may be discovered making the transcriptions of text in the workplace, so he began taking the documents to his residence and photographing them.

19. User 1 also described to the FBI his interactions with the individual posting under the Subject Username. In the course of those interactions, User 1 learned that the individual posting under the Subject Username called himself “Jack,” appeared to reside in Massachusetts, and claimed that he was in the United States Air National Guard (“USANG”). User 1 described the individual posting under the Subject Username as a white male who was clean-cut in appearance and between 20 and 30 years old.

20. On or about April 12, 2023, Social Media Platform 1 provided the FBI withrecords pursuant to legal process. These records included information related to User 1’s Social Media Platform 1 Account and the subscriber information for the administrator of Server 1 to which User 1 belonged.

21. According to these records, the individual using the Subject Username is the administrator of Server 1, the billing name associated with the Subject Username is “Jack Teixeira,” and the billing address associated with the Subject Username is a specific residence in North Dighton, Massachusetts. Teixeira listed the North Dighton, Massachusetts residence as his primary residence on employment paperwork with the USANG. On April 13, 2023 the FBI arrested TEIXEIRA at that residence in North Dighton, Massachusetts.

22. On April 13, 2023, User 1 also identified TEIXEIRA’s Registry of Motor Vehicles photo from a photo lineup as the individual he knew as “Jack” who had posted Government Information under the Subject Username on Social Media Platform 1.

23. According to a review of government records and information, since May 2022,TEIXEIRA has been serving as an E-3/Airman First Class in the USANG and has been stationed at Otis Air National Guard Base in Massachusetts. TEIXEIRA enlisted in the USANG in September 2019 as an E-1 rank. As of February 2023, TEIXEIRA’s title was Cyber Defense Operations Journeyman.

24. As required for this position, TEIXEIRA holds a Top Secret security clearance, which was granted in 2021. Based on my training and experience, I know that to acquire his security clearance, TEIXEIRA would have signed a lifetime binding non-disclosure agreement inwhich he would have had to acknowledge that the unauthorized disclosure of protected information could result in criminal charges.

25. In addition to TEIXEIRA’s Top Secret clearance, he maintained sensitive compartmented access (SCI) to other highly classified programs. He has also had this access since 2021.

26. The Government Document posted on Social Media Platform 1 was accessible to TEIXEIRA by virtue of his employment with USANG. According to a U.S. Government Agency, which has access to logs of certain documents TEIXEIRA accessed, TEIXEIRA accessed the Government Document in February 2023, approximately one day before User 1 reposted the information on the Internet. User 1 told the FBI that the information he reposted was originally posted on Server 1 by the individual using the Subject Username.

27.In addition, according to a second U.S. Government Agency, which can monitor certain searches conducted on its classified networks, on April 6, 2023, TEIXEIRA used his government computer to search classified intelligence reporting for the word “leak.” The first public reporting regarding the Government Information appeared on or around April 6, 2023.Accordingly, there is reason to believe that TEIXEIRA was searching for classified reporting regarding the U.S. Intelligence Community’s assessment of the identity of the individual who transmitted classified national defense information, to include the Government Document.

Sources

Teixeira Complaint, United States of America v Jack Douglas Teixeira (Case No. 23-4293-DHH), Scribd, 2023-04-14

Snowden and Texeira: Ten Years of Disaster, Criag Murray, his website, 2023-04-16

BELLINGCAT & NEW YORK TIMES LET THE CAT OUT OF THE PENTAGON PAPERS BAG – THE POLISH CAT TRIES TO GET OFF THE HOT UKRAINIAN ROOF BEFORE THE ELECTION, John Helmer, Dances with Bears, 2023-04-23

Update

John Helmer provides a description of Teixeira’s appearence in court and details of the exchange between the judge and lawyers representing both parties. The charges have been amended to include a lesser charge which hints that the government may be working towards a plea bargain for the lesser. This could be for several reasons. That they do not wish for the public trial to go ahead as their case is weak, or that details they would rather not be discussed may emerge. Who knows?

Breaking News From The Donbass Front, The Teixeira Case, and then from Canada — What Happens To The Ottawa Regime When The Kiev Regime Is Defeated, John Helmer, Dancing with Bears, 2023-04-30

More udpates …

DOJ & Ukraine - Where's the Truth? Larry Johnson fmr CIA, Napolitano interviews Johnson, Judging Freedom

• The Tiexiera "arsenal" are paint-ball guns

• FBI are idiots or lying to the judge or both

Culture

Reckless (Don't Be So...) (Official Audio), Australian Crawl (from the 1983 EP ‘Semantics’), EMI (Geffen in the UK), uploaded to Australian Crawl’s youtube channel 2021-11-07

---

Notification

Subscription is optional. Subscribers can expect notifications for most articles. Better is to use RSS (feed), or bookmark the Archive page and visit at leisure. If you use Twitter, following @YesXorNo1 is also a partially effective notifications strategy.

Copyright and Licensing

This work is copyright to the blog's author with CC BY-SA 4.0 licensing. Have fun, reuse, remix etc. but give credit and place no further restrictions. Let’s build culture.