Winds of Change in the Sahel

The AES matures as neighbouring states look on

[Just a map of a part of Africa, with the nations which feature in this article named. Ignore the numbers.]

Published: 2024-12-04

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The Eastern Flank

Back in the distant past of May, 2024, this newsletter reported on an expansion of French colonial banishment from the Sahel. The nations of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso formed a collective defence military union which has matured. Their Western trained military leaders now lead governments (juntas) and told the French military to leave. Niger also forced the US to abandon its prized drone surveillance base in Agadez.

The developing rejection of French military "protection" has moved eastward to Chad, and potentially westward to Senegal.

After 66 years since the independence of the Republic of Chad, it is time for Chad to assert its full sovereignty, and to redefine its strategic partnerships according to national priorities,

stated Chad's Foreign Minister Abderaman Koulamallah on 2024-11-28

Koulamallah's statement was delivered after he had met with French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot in the capital N'Djamena at which the security cooperation agreement from 2019 was terminated. France has about 1000 military personnel in Chad which it will need to repatriate.

Chad's current interim President Mahamat Deby Itno took the role after his father was killed fighting rebels in 2021. Deby senior had ruled Chad for three decades.

Chad reassured France that its severance of security relations is not a rejection of other areas of cooperation. The government did need to respond to "widespread anti-French sentiment", noted Ulf Laessing, head of the Sahel program at Konrad Adenauer foundation in Mali.

Any diplomat could read between the phrase "strategic partnerships" and see Russia and China.

[The graphic indicates general political change, not a shift in official memberships of the two organisations depicted. But, it must be lonely being in the G5 Sahel, now, Mauritania.]

The Western Flank

To the west of the band of nations in the Sahel which have rejected French (and US) military protection lies former French property, Senegal.

In March, 2024, Diomaye Faye was elected President after the Constitutional Court had to force the previous President Macky Sall to hold elections after he’d delayed them. Faye's platform included redefining Senegal's relationship with its "former" colonial master. As a component of that, Senegal is re-examining its history with France.

In 2014, French President Hollande gave to Senegal an archive of its records. One particular incident in Senegalese history, from 1944, has been avoided until recently, due to its sensitivity, in the historical reassessment. After having been released from German prisoner-of-war camps in WWII, returned Senegalese riflemen protested for their wages. The unarmed Senegalese soldiers were massacred by the French. The 80th anniversary of that black mark on the nations' histories was 2024-12-01.

Current French President Macron sent a letter to Faye formally acknowledging the massacre as a massacre, though not specifying the number of victims. This is apparently missing from the French archives already provided. The uncertain tentative range is from 35 to 400. Descendants of the murdered Senegalese soldiers still visit the nameless graves or their parents of grandparents in a military cemetery.

President Faye expressed his displeasure at the French military presence in Senegal (currently 350 military personnel):

Senegal is an independent country; it is a sovereign country and sovereignty does not accept the presence of military bases in a sovereign country ... Historically, France enslaved, colonized and stayed here ... Obviously, I think that when you reverse the roles a little, you will have a hard time conceiving that another army, China, Russia, Senegal, or any other country could have a military base in France.

In an interview with Le Monde, Faye stated "soon there will be no more French soldiers in Senegal."

One wonders what “Little Napolean” Macron intends to do about this?

Institutions

The member states of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, are some of the poorest, globally. Their economies are dominantly agricultural and the Saharan deserts are extending southward. Their rejection of "protection" from the French and US is partially due to the Western states’ utter failure to assist with the real problem of lawless militias (terrorism). The fact that they are still so poor indicates that that whatever "development" models have been tried have also utterly failed. With the current changes in geostrategic balance, new opportunities are emerging.

Antoine Somdah is Burkina Faso's former ambassador to the Russian Federation, an expert in international law and nuclear law, and was a member of the United Nations Security Council (2008 and 2009). In an interview with Modern Diplomacy, Somdah provided a overview into the types of developmental approaches being considered by the AES.

[Antoine Somdah]

To begin the interview Somdah reminded the reader why the AES was created:

I would like to remind you that it was following the ineffectiveness of the security response, the weak solidarity, or even the abandonment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the face of the terrorist scourge, the irresponsible economic sanctions and especially the threat of military intervention in Niger that the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) was born.

Strategically speaking, it is a collective defense and mutual assistance bloc aimed at countering any ECOWAS military intervention or any external threat including terrorism and with the ambition of sub-regional economic integration.

He outlined the AES' rapid establishment between January and July of 2024:

On January 28, 2024, the Alliance countries announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS. Then, on February 15, a meeting of the Alliance member countries was held in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), which laid the foundations for the creation of a confederation. On March 6, the Alliance also announced the formation of a joint anti-terrorist force and in May it finalized the draft treaty creating the Confederation of the Alliance, with the aim of completing the draft text relating to the institutionalization and operationalization of the Alliance of Sahel States. Recently, on July 6, 2024, the first summit of the Alliance of Sahel States was held in Niamey, Niger, which saw the adoption of the Treaty establishing the Confederation of Sahel States.

Next, he described the types of institutions being created to facilitate economic development among the confederation. On top of "the creation of structuring projects in the fields of energy, infrastructure, transport and food security", "the creation of a stabilization fund and an investment bank" is recommended.

The AES states have not entirely withdrawn from the Western instrumented ECOWAS. They have:

reaffirmed their membership in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), [a sub-institution] of ECOWAS, in order to minimize the sudden economic shock that the AES area could undergo.

Somdah is straightforward about where these concepts are originating:

The growing relations between China, Russia and the emerging governments of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger suggest a geopolitical reconfiguration in West Africa. But first, it must be said that China and Russia are themselves essential strategic partners. The AES Heads of State have decided to take their destiny into their own hands and move away from facade and ineffective partnerships to sincere partners such as Russia and China, but also Turkey.

[Given Turkey’s recent behaviour, it’s involvement is now questionable.]

He continues, speaking plainly of the changes occurring in the region:

China, mainly established on the African continent thanks to large investments, seems increasingly to want to focus on the East coast where the country launched its New Silk Roads project in 2017. It is engaged in the Sahel in several areas such as agriculture, trade, security, energy and infrastructure.

Russia’s influence is also felt throughout the continent, but with a more significant presence in French-speaking Africa and the Sahel, taking advantage of the departure of all French soldiers of the Barkhane force from Malian territory in August 2022. Indeed, with nearly 3,000 soldiers engaged since 2013 in the Sahel, the French anti-jihadist force Barkhane has faced the rise of anti-French sentiment in a few years, with the Malian authorities having preferred to move closer to Russia and the help of the paramilitary troops of the Wagner Group. In September 2022, the Burkinabe authorities who had just come to power also expressed their desire to move closer to Russia despite France following the protests against the Barkhane force.

Collaboration in science and technology between AES and its partners is also being facilitated through the Organisation of Islamic States:

The STI Agenda 2026 (science, technology and innovation) of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) adopted in 2017 in Astana, Kazakhstan, covers a number of urgent areas of inter-state cooperation, ranging from building a culture of science and innovation among young people to improving the employability of people, including water security, food and the environment; promoting healthy lives for all citizens and improving the quality of higher education and research, among others.

On the bilateral level, it should be noted that these countries have chosen a strategic partnership with the Russian Federation. Burkina Faso has been in partnership with Russia (Russian Agency Rosatom) since October 2023 for the construction of a nuclear power plant. On February 20, 2024, the three energy companies of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger during their meeting in Ouagadougou defined the strategies to secure the supply of electrical energy to the AES countries; this event marks the beginning of the optimization and pooling of clean energy resources by diversifying the choice of strategic partners.

Niger has been providing France with Uranium for its nuclear reactors for decades. It may in the future be selling some of that to Burkina Faso for a new reactor. The power from it may be distributed across areas of the 3 AES states via a collaboration of their national energy companies.

These regional scale visions require investments in both funding and education. Russia has a history of this approach — training the local population to manage the infrastructure which it helps create. China has not only the finance and engineering capability, but also expertise in lifting people out of poverty.

The AES member states' choice of their new partners is not without merit.

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Sources

Senegal and Chad just sent the French military packing. Why?, Alex Thurston, Responsible Statecraft, 2024-12-03

The Alliance of Sahel States: Implications, challenges and prospects in West Africa, Kester Kenn Klomegah interviews Antoine SOMDAH, Modern Diplomacy, 2024-09-17

Chad breaks off military pact with France; Senegal wants French troops out, Politico, IA Wayback Machine (originally Politico), 2024-12-02

Chad ends a defense cooperation agreement with France, its former colonial ruler, AP, IA Wayback Machine (originally AP News), 2024-11-29

Senegal demands answers as the West African country commemorates a French colonial massacre, AP, IA Wayback Machine (originally AP News), 2024-12-02

Chad ends military cooperation with France, Al Jazeera, IA Wayback Machine (originally Al Jazeera), 2024-11-29

A Geographical Analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa, Brewminate: A Bold Blend of News and Ideas, 2018-05-04

• This article is the source of several maps.

G5 (du) Sahel, Wikipedia

The Sahel: A Trifecta of US Self-Coups, YesXorNo, 2024-05-13

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