Advanced Persistent Radar Lock
A consistent analysis of an event and a new approach
Published: 2024-11-13
All on board
In this newsletter's summary of expert opinion on Iran's attack on Israel of 2024-10-26 views expressed were consistent, but for one significant outlier, Scott Ritter.
During Ritter's interview on Dialogue Works on 2024-11-12, Alkhorshid raised topic of Israel's threats under new Defence Minister Katz to attack Iran's nuclear facilities.
Ritter concluded that Israel had no viable option to perform the "kind of sustained precision strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities that would be required to destroy [them]". To reach this conclusion Ritter cited Crooke's analysis. This leaves Crooke's analysis as the surviving best independent analysis of that military engagement.
In his restatement of Crooke's analysis Ritter brought us closer to the view of a pilot in a SEAD ("Suppression of Enemy Air Defence") operation. Recall, the operation is to fly into the range of detection but not as far as the maximum range of the missile defence, and while in that "safe" range launch missiles at the defence radars which are lit up detecting the attack. As Ritter related, the Israeli pilots were "locked on". They fired their SEAD munitions. After those should have destroyed the defense radars they were still "locked on".
That is why the mission was aborted. There was no low risk option to fly beyond the "70 to 100" Km range distant from the border between Iraq and Iran into Iran's airspace. They met one, or more, persistent enemy radar types.
Information Exposure
The dangerous game of military maneuvers close to enemy borders, including this Israeli attack on Iran, reveals information about both sides. Israel learned of unknown Iranian air defence capabilities which were not destroyed by their SEAD operation.
This is unsurprising, as it was known that Russia had provided Iran with additional air defense systems. As the US Intelligence Leak revealed, not only does the US DoD know that Israel has nuclear weapons, but also that:
Israel's covert UAVs enable long-range, covert surveillance in Iran and throughout the region.
So, Israel was expecting potentially unknown radars (air defence systems) and they found one or more. They were probably Russian S-400 systems. Israel can add what they learned during the attack to their existing knowledge.
While the primary purpose of Israel's mission was to launch some if not all of the 56 air-launched ballistic missiles (16 Golden Horizon and 40 ROCKS, as identified in the Intel Leak), it would have made sense to also learn of whether the unknown radars could detect F-35s.
According to WDMMA Israel has 272 strike or multi-role jets.
Israel has 25 F-15s and 25 F-35s on order thanks to gifts from the Biden administration.
Crooke suggested that Iran detected at least some of Israel's F-35 "stealth" jets. The Russia air-defence systems located in Iran were operated by trained Russia operators. If such a detection occurred, Russia now understands some of the radar profiles of the Israeli F-35s. That it occured is very likely because otherwise the F-35s would have flown on to launch their munitions, and we have no evidence that any significant damage was done in Iran (excluding the lives of 4 soldiers).
A pattern observed in Crimea during the war in Ukraine has been the ever increasing success rate for Russian air defence systems against NATO missiles. Each missile type has distinguishing characteristics in its flight profile. As Russia was able to integrated these characteristics into its air defence systems the interception rate increased. A similar situation must be the case for jets, which are fish in a barrel compared to intercepting missiles.
As this newsletter noted in its article presenting analysis of the failed Zionist air-launched missile attack against Iran:
Crooke posited another potential factor. Israeli F-35 pilots may have met an operational anti-stealth ADC. If this is what occurred, it has changed the geostrategic picture. It nullifies the efficacy of stealth airplanes against prepared Russian and/or Iranian ADCs and turns the US F-35 program into an even more colossal waste of funds.
It seems likely that this change in the geostrategic picture has occurred. The weakening of US stealth strike capability is a major blow to its power projection. It has yet to develop hypersonic missiles, while its other missiles and jets are vulnerable to Russian, and possibly Iranian, missile defence systems. One should assume that Russia has shared with China at least its S-400 capability. Note also, that it is not Russia's best, the S-550, which it keeps for itself.
Beyond Air Defence
During the war in Ukraine, the latest generation of ground warfare has been on display. It is dominated by drones unless one side has air superiority, in which case the domination expands to artillery and air-launched glide bombs.
That the war would be won by Russia was known the moment in began. Russia's rapid defeat of the US and EU's economic warfare (sanctions) was surprising, even to Russia. With that out of the way, Russia defeated the NATO armed and trained Armed Forces of Ukraine employing its careful war of attrition using ground operational tactics which are still being honed.
Russia now has a series of dominant military advantages. Its military production exceeds all of NATO. Its air defense systems are far superior. NATO has no defence against its hypersonic missiles. Its military has fought the latest version of ground combat. It has the experience at the platoon level. NATO's is limited to upper command which has been involved in coordinating phases of the Armed Forces of Ukraine's side of the war.
It is fortunate for the US that re-elected and soon to assume office President Trump preferences negotiation over war. Since July 2023 RAND Corporation has been advocating that the US needs to adjust its military strategy. It admits that the US previous strategy, which it termed "decisive expeditionary force",
was predicated on U.S. military forces that were superior in all domains to those of any adversary.
That superiority is gone, surely with respect to China but in significant ways with respect to the forces of other, less powerful adversaries as well, and it is not coming back.
Recent caution by the US Secretary of Defence Austin must have been motivated by advice from the military itself, meaning the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other inputs. That caution was displayed by not approving long range strikes into Russia and advising Israel against attacking non-military targets in Iran.
The US military has recognized its limitations, as its leadership must.
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Sources
Israeli Air Force (2024) Aircraft Inventory, WDMMA, 2024
Israel Signs $5.2 Billion Contract With Boeing To Purchase F-15s With US Aid, Dave DeCamp, Antiwar, 2024-11-07
Inflection Point, How to Reverse the Erosion of U.S. and Allied Military Power and Influence, RAND, 2023-07-25
Collapsing Empire: China and Russia Checkmate US Military, Kit Klarenberg, Kit’s Newsletter, 2024-10-29
Commission on the National Defense Strategy:
“Congress created the Commission on the National Defense Strategy in the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act as an independent body charged with assessing the 2022 National Defense Strategy. Its members are non-governmental experts in national security. The Commission released its final report on July 29, 2024. RAND contributed analytic and administrative support.”
Report, RAND Corp, 2024-06-29
Executive Summary, RAND Corp, 2024-08-22
Why Defense Contractors Are Saying No to Their Biggest Customer: The Pentagon, Doug Cameron & Drew FitzGerald, Wall St. Journal, 2024-01-30
Israel v Iran: Zionist Strategic and Operational Failure, YesXorNo, 2024-10-29
Usrael Intel Leaks, YesXorNo, 2024-10-22
Scott Ritter ｜ Israel on the Brink： Internal Chaos & Shocking Middle East Power Shift Unfolding! [ZEP7sfAyRVM], Alkhorshid interviews Ritter, Dialogue Works, 2024-11-12
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