Jacques Baud on the Russian Art of War

How the West can win the conflict in Ukraine.

Published: 2024-04-03

---

Understanding

If one wishes to understand why NATO has utterly failed in their efforts to support Ukraine in its war against Russia from the perspective of NATO advisors, military or otherwise, who believe this was NATO's intention, there is no better series of explanations than contained in The Duran's interview with Jacques Baud.

Baud hits every, single nail, smack on the middle of its head.

The failure of the wonder weapons, check. The brainless narratives carried by the NATO media, check. The insanity of Macron's recent antics, check.

The adjective 'honest' will be used henceforth to refer to NATO members who believe in the Ukrainian cause and the actions which NATO has taken in supporting Ukraine. Many believe that elements of the "West", the US in particular, have far more ulterior motives. Only the ‘honest’ discussion is considered below.

Jacques Baud

Baud is a rare individual. He was a member of the Swiss military and military intelligence who, during the Cold War, studied Soviet military doctrine and culture to the level of attempting to understand their thinking. He also worked in NATO from a country which is not a member of it, and made a similar study, though this was not his job.

One can summarize his thesis in 4 words: "The Art of War", by Sun Tsu. While honest members of NATO's military leadership may have read the work they have not understood it. In fact, the reliance on knowledge, or data, rather than understanding is a theme throughout Baud's analysis of NATO's failure, both in the war in Ukraine and more generally, at a military and political institutional level. As one listens to his critique, one learns of a systemic Western failure across both realms.

Contrary to NATO leaders, especially military, Baud's understanding of Soviet and Russian thinking and his rejection of the NATO's reflexive response to categorize anything which Russia's leadership says as propaganda or misdirection, has enabled him to see Russia's military actions in their natural context. Equivalently, his understanding of NATO's reflex actions and the manner in which it has conducted its military campaigns has allowed him to understand their failure in their context. This is the power of his analysis. He has taken both parts of Sun Tsu's advice to heart, that "One must understand one's adversary at least as well as one understands oneself".

The initial 1.5 hours of the interview with Mercouris contains insight after insight using example after example from the conflict to illuminate them. There is no replacement for listening to the interview, except reading his books, the most recent of which Mercouris had.

Unstrategic War

A foundational error in the West is that it's approach to this conflict never had an operational strategy. It still does not. It could not have, because the West never understood Russia's aims even though Russian Federation President Putin stated them in the clearest possible terms on the first day of the Special Military Operation: demilitarization and denazification. Nowhere is territory mentioned in these objectives. They are about neutralizing threat capability. When viewed through these perspectives Russia's behaviour is clear. When viewed through NATO's projected understanding of their own tactical, rather than strategic, concept of war, Russia's actions look like failure.

One can extend some of Baud's analysis. The reason that persons like Col. Macgregor have been able to read the war so well is not necessarily because of access to secret data. It is because they took Russia, diplomatically, strategically and operationally, at face value. The constant NATO focus on territory indicates that they do not know how to measure this war because they do not understand Russia's aims. Macgregor and others can measure it because they do understand Russia. Baud provides examples other than the late summer Russian withdrawals from Kharkiv and Kherson to illuminate this point.

Russia's initial actions in the first days of the war are a perfect example of the above, and another aspect of 'honest' NATO advisors' failure.

Russia's military separate three planes of thinking in war; the tactical, operational art and strategy. NATO engages in war at the tactical level. This is about a specific engagement and is measured in terms of items destroyed or enemy killed or captured. Operational art is the 'chess' of war; how one positions ones forces and assets to influence one's opponent's ability to utilize their assets. Strategy is the changing process one uses to achieve one's aims. Tactical engagements are designed to reinforce one's operational art. This, in turn, is to provide advantage in ‘the conflict’. This advantage is to then be used to achieve one's aims. We shall return to 'the conflict' below. There is much more to the term, in a Russia view, than a NATO one.

Russia's initial actions in the war serve as an example of this tripartite approach which were explained to the West by Russia itself some few weeks afterwards. Mercouris informs us that the explanation is still available at the Russian Ministry of Defense web page.

At the outset, the vast majority of Russia's prepared forces were sent into the Donbas. This was to secure those people against the threat of the impending genocide signaled by the massive increase in shelling which this newsletter noted as it was happening from OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) reports. Baud quotes the exact same OSCE statistics which lead this author to understand the threat. Baud even quotes the date, the 16th, because President Biden had spoken of it. Biden knew of the battlefield preparation, shelling, for the assault on Donbas and thus when it would begin. With Russia's major force sent to secure the people of the Donbas against the threatened assault, a secondary force was sent to pressure the outskirts of Kiev.

As Baud states, and as other military professionals have acknowledged, there was no way in which this force could have taken Kiev. It was wildly insufficient. But, it served "operational art" and a strategic purpose at once. It forced Ukraine's "rear" forces in the center and west of Ukraine to be fixed or move towards Kiev. This secured the primary objective by denying reinforcement to Ukraine's forces in the east and south. This enabled Russia's military to establish themselves, including the extension from Crimea into Kherson and parts of Zaporozhye, which would later become its primary logistics corridor. The second purpose of the minor force on the outskirts of Kiev was to let Ukraine know that it had picked a fight with Russia. This was serious, and if they'd like to engage in political discussions to stop all of this before lots of people started dying, now would be good time to do that. This objective was also achieved.

Zelensky immediately called for negotiations. These were denied him by the EU. Days later negotiations did begin in Belarus. These collapsed for several reasons, one of which was the Ukrainian assassination of one of its own negotiators. Given Ukraine's assassination of various individuals during the war, one can understand from where this order is likely to have come. A few weeks later the negotiations in Istanbul were established. Were it not for Boris Johnson, representing the US/NATO block, these would have succeeded and Russia’s forces would have left Ukraine. The settlement had little to do with territory. It was about threat elimination.

Russia achieved both aspects of its initial aims. It secured the people of the Donbas by positioning its forces there and keeping Ukrainian reinforcements away. It also repeatedly achieved the establishment of negotiations. Western analysis failed because it was based on the false narrative that Russia was trying to take Kiev. The West ignored what Russia was saying and instead its media published a fictional narrative.

Another aspect of the analysis which is insightful are the 'wunderweapon' failures. Baud takes the example of the M777 howitzer or French equivalent. These are precision weapons designed to destroy enemy positions quickly. They are based on 'colonial war' thinking. Fighting foreign wars against non-western military powers lends itself to these types of weapons. Logistics lines are long in colonial battles. Engagements need to be quick and devastating to minimize the tonnage of ammunition which logistics must deliver. Conversely, Russia's military is designed primarily to fight on its soil with short distances for logistics. Its approach to artillery is saturation fire. Interestingly, the use of drones actually gave Ukraine an early advantage in this, though Baud does not address this topic. Russia did 'catch up' in its tactical use of drones. It also improved its counter battery surveillance to identify the locations of Ukrainian artillery and so was able to eventually counter this threat. Meanwhile, its non-counter artillery was doing what it does, saturating enemy positions with explosive ordinance and killing enemy combatants, day after day after day after day.

Integration

In returning to 'the conflict', Baud understands how Russia thinks about war. It is an holistic, whole nation approach which is very different to that of NATO. In NATO member states the military is a 'society within a society'. This phrase Baud heard from his British colleagues. It is different to that of the Swiss. In Switzerland the people are the army. For NATO nations the 'professional' military are a small subset of the population for which the nation has limited concern. This is certainly true of nations like France. The degree to which this can be applied to Britain or the US may vary. Russia's approach is closer to that of Switzerland. Its history is of its people uniting to defend their lands against foreign invaders; from the Mongols from the east and south, to the French or the Germans from the west, or the British and French from the south.

Back in the dark ages of the last millennium, the 1990s, the documentary series "Battlefield" was made to cover many of the major battles for WWII. It uses a consistent structure, narrators and archival footage (though a lot of this is repeated) to recount significant battles. By listening to hours and hours of this one can reflect on not only the history but the turning points. One can form an understanding of war and what capacities a nation requires to not only survive but win large scale conflicts.

A lesson which your author took from these hours and hours was that for a nation's military to dominate its adversaries it requires equivalence in 4 aspects of war. Which are more important at one point or another can change, as can which are more available. They are production (of military hardware and its delivery; aka logistics), leadership (competent military command), morale (motivated forces) and technology (arrows are never going to beat guns). Through this lens one can look at Russia's situation early in WWII. Its production was capable but not scaled. Its military leadership was terrible, having been eviscerated by Stalin. Its technology was reasonable, though a little behind, and not up to the engineering mastery of Germany. Its morale was good. By the end of the war, Russia's morale was at least as good. Its technology had improved but did not outclass Germany, though there is an interesting footnote. Its leadership rapidly improved. Its production was almost as good as the US', which was incredible. Russia was fighting a war on its territory. The US was oceans away. It was the production which won the war. Russia knows this and has never forgotten it.

That technical footnote is the T-34/76 and then T-34-86 tank. They were not as 'beautiful', from an engineering aesthetic, as German tanks. They were optimized for two purposes; mass production and good enough to be an effective "platform", as the post-modern language of war terms these things.

This issue of production or logistics, Baud touches on from a political perspective. Russia has maintained its state owned military production capacity. It is not 'commercial' (capitalist). It is not meant to make a profit. It is meant to exist and to be able to be revved up when needed. This Russia has done and is vastly outproducing all of NATO (somewhere between 3 times and 7 times depending on which classes of weaponry or equipment one selects).

These concepts of morale, leadership, technology and production are, in my opinion, a window into Russia's understanding of war. It is a whole picture. It involves, people, industry, the government, the church, resources, finances, everything. Russia's military is not a society within a society.

Rather, Russia's military is the part of Russia which is meant to be ready for war if it is needed. If it is needed, the rest of Russia works with it, via its doctrine and art, to achieve the strategic objectives. These objectives are proposed to the people by the nation's leadership. If the people agree, the whole of Russia goes to war to achieve the objectives. Russia’s leadership has conveyed to its people the existential nature of this conflict. It concerns the placement of close proximity nuclear weapons by NATO. Russia will not stand for this.

Victory

If the West wishes to win this war, it can, and very easily. It begins by listening to Russia. The two strategic objectives, demilitarization and denazification are clear enough. Russia has recently added another, that to discuss a resolution it requires an interlocutor which understands the reality on the ground. This is clear enough too.

NATO's victory condition could be that Ukraine and its neighbours live in peace and prosperity. See the recently published suggestion for how to engage Russia in achieving this victory condition.

NATO can be victorious. It is purely about the definition of victory, and choosing a strategy to achieve it.

Sources

Automatic Nuclear War, YesXorNo, 2024-03-27

[US] NATO v Russia: 2014 - 2024, YesXorNo, 2024-03-09

Battlefield, a youtube playlist

Russian art of war w⧸ Jacques Baud (Live), Mercouris and Christoforou interview Baud, The Duran, 2024-03-26

---

Copyleft: CC0